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This paper examines fiscal sustainability in an inflationary environment, particularly the 
interrelation between government debt and inflation. A model that explicitly incorporates the 
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behavior and inflation are determined through the simultaneous optimization of government and 
households. The sustainable fiscal debt in an inflationary environment was found to equal the 
present value of primary balances discounted by the time preference rate of government, not by 
the interest rate. This result raises the question of whether it is appropriate to apply the fiscal 
sustainability test of Hamilton and Flavin to high inflation countries. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
     The argument that inflation will eventually accelerate if the government budget deficit 
increases greatly has an intuitive appeal. Many economists might accept the notion that 
unrestrained government borrowing will increase prices, a concept which implies that fiscal 
sustainability and inflation interact with one another. Hence, it appears that careful 
consideration must be given to the interrelation between government debt and inflation when 
analyzing fiscal sustainability. However, much of the literature on fiscal sustainability has not 
sufficiently considered the interrelation between them and has instead directed attention only to 
economic activities in the real term (e.g., Hamilton and Flavin, 1986; Trehan and Walsh, 1988; 
Wilcox, 1989; Blanchard et. al., 1990; Hakkio and Rush, 1991; Haug, 1991; Ahmed and Rogers, 
1995; Bohn, 1995). Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and Bohn (1995), two of the most prominent 
papers in this field, are not exceptions: they hardly mention the interrelation between 
government debt and inflation. 
     On the other hand, the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) directly examines the 
interrelation between government debt and inflation ― more correctly, the interrelation between 
government debt and the price level (e.g., Leeper, 1991; Sims, 1994, 1998, 2001; Woodford, 
1995, 2001; Cochrane, 1998a, 1998b, 2000). Although the focal point of the FTPL is not fiscal 
sustainability but price level, the FTPL also has an important implication on fiscal sustainability. 
According to the FTPL, fiscal sustainability can always be held because a government behaves 
so as to hold it in case of the Ricardian regime and households adjust prices so as to hold it in 
case of the non-Ricardian regime. Thus, the FTPL implies that any fiscal policy can be 
sustainable. Buiter (2002, 2004) criticizes the FTPL on this very point. He has denounced the 
FTPL as false because if default is ruled out, budget constraints must always be satisfied by any 
economic agent. This problem seems to be rooted in the very nature of the FTPL such that the 
concept of non-Ricardian fiscal policy is too general and allows too many fiscal policies. The 
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FTPL implicitly assumes that, in case of the non-Ricardian regime, households are totally 
passive and obey any fiscal policy. In any case, households will surely buy the bonds issued by 
the government and adjust prices accordingly. Hence, any fiscal policy can be sustainable. In 
actuality, households do not appear so passive as to obey a government, buy the bonds issued by 
the government, and adjust prices accordingly. As a result, the FTPL has been regarded as a 
useless gimmick which vaguely argues a curious possibility of fiscal sustainability. 
     The purpose of my paper is to solve the aforementioned problems with the conventional 
theory of fiscal sustainability and the FTPL and to present an explanation for fiscal 
sustainability in an inflationary environment. The drawbacks of both theories suggest that it is 
necessary to construct a model of government’s borrowing behavior to analyze fiscal 
sustainability in an inflationary environment. I construct such a model in this paper.     
Several important results are obtained by the model. First, the sustainable fiscal debt in an 
inflationary environment is equal to the present value of primary balances discounted by the 
time preference rate of government, less than the value discounted by the interest rate in 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986). Secondly, the model indicates the relation between the level of 
government debt and the inflation rate is not linear. In addition, the model indicates that a 
government gains by deliberately making inflation accelerate because steady state primary 
balance becomes smaller.  
     The paper is organized as follows. A model that explicitly incorporates the government’s 
borrowing behavior is constructed in section II. The model shows that the behavior of 
government is neither Ricardian nor non-Ricardian, but that the government behavior is optimal 
and consistent with both the budget constraint and the transversality condition. In section III, the 
model is used to show that the sustainable fiscal debt in an inflationary environment is equal to 
the present value of primary balances discounted by the time preference rate of government. In 
section IV, the appropriateness of the fiscal sustainability test developed by Hamilton and 
Flavin (1986) is questioned, particularly as it applies to some developing countries where high 
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inflation is still endemic. Concluding remarks are offered in section V. 
 
II. THE MODEL 
 
1. An economically Leviathan government  
     The model assumes a Leviathan government.1 As is known well, there are two extremely 
different views regarding government behavior—the Leviathan view and the benevolent view. 
In the Leviathan view, a government gives priority to pursuing its objectives. In the benevolent 
view, a government maximizes utility the same as a representative household does. Because the 
fiscal and monetary policies of a benevolent government are practically under the control of the 
representative household, the optimal behavior of a benevolent government is to supply money 
to the representative household’s saturation point and keep the deflation rate equal to the real 
interest rate (the Friedman rule) (Friedman, 1969). In the benevolent view, therefore, inflation is 
basically unrelated to government fiscal behavior. Hence, a model based on the benevolent view 
appears inappropriate for the purpose of an analysis of fiscal sustainability in an inflationary 
environment that focuses on the interrelation between a government’s borrowing behavior and 
inflation. On the other hand, it is not necessarily guaranteed that the Leviathan government’s 
behavior has no influence on the development of inflation because the fiscal and monetary 
policies of a Leviathan government are not perfectly under the control of the representative 
household. I therefore assume a Leviathan government in this model.  
     From an economic point of view, a benevolent government maximizes the expected 
utility of the representative household, but a Leviathan government does not. Unlike a 
benevolent government, a Leviathan government is therefore not managed by politically neutral 
bureaucrats who are obligated to mechanically maximize the expected economic utility of the 
representative household at any time and under any political party that forms a government. It is 
                                                          
1 The most prominent reference of Leviathan governments is Brennan and Buchanan (1980). 
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instead managed by politicians who have strong political wills to achieve their own political 
objectives by all means.2 Hence, while the expenditure of a benevolent government is a tool to 
maximize the economic utility of the representative household, the expenditure of a Leviathan 
government is a tool to achieve the government’s policy objectives. For instance, if a Leviathan 
government considers national security to be the most important political issue, the expenditure 
on defense will be increased greatly. If the improvement of social welfare is the top priority, 
however, the expenditure on social welfare will be increased dramatically. 
     Is it possible, however, for such a Leviathan government to hold office for a long period? 
It is possible if both economic and political points of view are considered. The majority of 
people will support a Leviathan government even though they know that the government does 
not necessarily pursue only the economic objectives of the representative household because 
people choose a government for both economic and political reasons. Households are not 
necessarily represented, from a political point of view, by the same representative household 
usually presumed in the economics literature. A government is generally chosen by the median 
of households under a proportional representation system, but the representative household 
usually presumed in the literature on economics is basically the mean household.3 Therefore, the 
economically representative household is not usually identical to the politically representative household. 
In other words, the Leviathan government argued here is an economically Leviathan government that 
maximizes the political utility of people whereas the conventional economically benevolent government 
maximizes the economic utility of people. 
     The Leviathan view generally requires the explicit inclusion of government expenditure, 
                                                          
2 The government behavior assumed in the FTPL reflects an aspect of a Leviathan government. Christiano and 
Fitzgerald (2000) argue that non-Ricardian policies correspond to the type of policies contemplated in the Ramsey 
literature, in which governments are viewed as selecting policies and committing themselves to those policies in 
advance of prices being determined in markets. 
3 See the literature on the median voter theorem (e.g., Downs 1957). Also see the literature on the delay in reforms 
(e.g., Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992; Alesina and Drazen 1991). 
 5
tax revenue, or related government activities in the political utility function of government (e.g., 
Edwards and Keen, 1996). A Leviathan government derives political utility from expenditure 
for its political purposes. Hence, the larger the expenditure is, the happier the Leviathan 
government will be. On the other hand, the Leviathan government knows that raising tax rates 
will provoke people’s antipathy and reduce the probability of being reelected, which makes the 
Leviathan government uncomfortable because it expects that it cannot expend money to achieve 
its purposes if it loses power. The Leviathan government may regard taxes as necessary costs to 
obtain freedom of expenditure for its own purposes. Expenditure and taxes in the political utility 
function of the government are analogous to consumption and labor hours in the economic 
utility function of the household. Consumption and labor hours are both control variables, and 
as such, the government’s expenditure and tax revenue are also control variables. Hence, the 
political utility function of government can be expressed as ( )ttG x,gu ,4 where 
t
t
t p
Gg =  is 
the real government expenditure, 
t
t
t p
Xx =  is the real tax revenue of government at time t, and 
Gt is nominal government expenditure, Xt is nominal tax revenue, and pt is the price level at time 
t. All variables are expressed in per capita terms. In addition, it can be assumed based on the 
previously mentioned arguments that 0>∂
∂
t
G
g
u  and 02
2
<∂
∂
t
G
g
u , and 0<∂
∂
t
G
x
u and 02
2
>∂
∂
t
G
x
u .5 
                                                          
4 It may be possible to assume that governments are partially benevolent. In this case the utility function of a 
government can be assumed to be ( )ttttG l,c,x,gu , where tc is real consumption and tl  is the leisure hours of the 
representative household. However, if a lump-sum tax is imposed, the government’s policies do not affect steady- 
state consumption and leisure hours. In this case, the utility function can be assumed to be ( )ttG x,gu . 
5 Some may argue that it is more likely that 0>∂
∂
t
G
x
u and 02
2
<∂
∂
t
G
x
u . Nevertheless, how they should be assumed 
 6
A Leviathan government therefore maximizes the expected sum of these utilities discounted by 
its time preference rate.   
     A Leviathan government pursues political objectives under the constraint of deficit 
financing. Even a Leviathan government must obey the budget constraint at any time. As a 
whole, the problem an economically Leviathan government should solve is a maximization 
problem of its expected political utility subject to the budget constraint. 
 
2. The model 
     The utility function of an economically Leviathan government is Gu  and is a constant 
relative risk aversion utility function. The government’s rate of time preference is Gθ . The tax 
is assumed to be lump sum. The budget constraint of the government is  
tttttt SXGRBB −−+=&  
where Bt is the accumulated nominal government bonds, Rt is the nominal interest rate for 
government bonds, and St is the nominal amount of seigniorage at time t. The government bonds 
are long-term bonds and the returns on government bonds Rt are realized only after holding the 
bonds during a unit of period, say a year. Government bonds are redeemed in a unit of period 
and the government successively refinances them by issuing new bonds at each time. Rt is 
composed of the real interest rate rt and the expected change of bonds’ price by inflation e tbπ ,  
such that e tbtt πrR ,+= . 
     Let 
t
t
t p
p
π
&=  be the inflation rate at time t. Because the returns on government bonds 
                                                                                                                                                                          
is not an important issue here because 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
x
x
x
,xgu
x
,xgux &  at the steady state as will be shown in the proof of 
the following proposition 1 and thus the results in the paper are not affected by how they are assumed.  
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are realized only after holding the bonds during a unit of period, investors buy the bonds if 
( )dsrπER t
t tstt ∫ + +≥ 1  at time t where tR  is the nominal interest rate for bonds bought at t. 
Hence, by arbitrage, ( )dsrπER t
t tstt ∫ + += 1  and ttt stt rdsπER += ∫ +1  if rt is constant, e.g. if at a 
steady state. This equation means that during a sufficiently small period between t and t + dt, the 
obligation of government to pay for the return on the bonds in future increases not by tπdt  but 
by dsπEdt
t
t st ∫ +1 . Because ttttt stttttttt BrdsπEBRBB ,1,,1, ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ +==− ∫ ++  where 1, +ttB is 
the value of bonds at time t + 1, which was issued at time t, then ttt
t
t sttt
BrdsπEB ,
1
, ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ += ∫ +& . 
If πt is constant, then ttt
t
t sttt
BrdsπEB ,
1
, ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ += ∫ +& ( ) tttttt BrπB ,, +=⇔ & , but if πt is not constant, 
they are not necessarily equivalent.6 
     Because bonds are redeemed in a unit of period and successively refinanced, the bonds 
the government is holding at t are composed of bonds issued during between t - 1 and t. Hence, 
under the perfect foresight, the average nominal interest rate for the total government bonds at 
time t is the weighted sum of tR  such that =⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
= ∫ ∫− −
ds
dvB
B
RR
t
t t
t tv
ts
st 1
1 ,
,  
t
t
t t
t tv
tss
s v
rds
dvB
B
dvπ +⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∫ ∫∫− −
+
1
1 ,
,1 . If the weights 
∫ −tt tv
ts
dvB
B
1 ,
,  between t - 1 and t are not so 
different each other, then approximately t
t
t
s
s vt
rdsdvπR += ∫ ∫− +1 1 . 7  In addition, if 
                                                          
6  ( ) tttttt BrπB ,, +=& has been used for many analyses because πt has been usually assumed to be constant. 
7 More precisely, if πt is constant, then ttt
t
t
s
s vt
rπrdsdvπR +=+= ∫ ∫− +1 1  for any set of weights. If πt is 
increasing, then 
t
t
t
s
s vt
t
t t
t tv
tss
s vt
rdsdvπrds
dvB
B
dvπR +>+⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
= ∫ ∫∫ ∫∫ −
+
−
−
+
1
1
1
1 ,
,1  in general because if 
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wt
t
t s
πdsπ +
+ =∫ 1  for some constant ( )10 ≤≤ ww  for any t (i.e., if dsπtt s∫ +1  is represented by 
wtπ +  for any t), then t
t
t
s
s vt
rdsdvπR += ∫ ∫− +1 1 twt wt s rdsπ += ∫ + +−1 . The average nominal interest 
rate for the total government bonds, therefore, develops by t
wt
wt st
rdsπR += ∫ + +−1  and thus e tbπ ,  
indicates a total price change by inflation during a unit of period such that dsππ
wt
wt s
e
b,t ∫ + +−= 1 . 
     Let 
t
t
t p
Bb =  and 
t
t
t p
Ss = . By dividing by pt, the budget constraint is transformed to  
ttttt
t
t sxgRb
p
B −−+=& , 
which is equivalent to  
( ) tttttttttttttt sxgπRbπbsxgRbb −−+−=−−−+=& . 
Hence, the optimization problem of the government is  
( ) ( )dttθ,xguEMax GttG −∫∞ exp00  
subject to  
( ) ttttttt sxgπRbb −−+−=& . 
The government maximizes its expected political utility considering the behavior of the 
representative household reflected in Rt in its budget constraint. 
     On the other hand, a representative household maximizes the following expected 
economic utility: 
( ) ( )dttθcuEMax PtP −∫∞ exp00  
                                                                                                                                                                          
new bonds are issued at t only for refinancing the redeemed bonds, then ( ) 1,11, 1 −−−+= ttttt BRB . In addition, if πt 
is increasing, t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ >∫ ∫− +1 1  and thus ttttt ss vt rπrdsdvπR +>+> ∫ ∫− +1 1 . Nevertheless, if 
weights are nearly equal, then approximately t
t
t
s
s vt
rdsdvπR += ∫ ∫− +1 1 . 
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where Pu  and Pθ  are the economic utility function and the rate of time preference of the 
representative household, subject to the following constraint:  
( ) tttt gckfk −−=& , 
where ( )⋅f  is the production function, tk  is the real capital per capita, and tc  is the real 
consumption per capita.8 The constraint means that the output ( )tkf  is demanded for private 
consumption ct, private investment tk& , and government expenditure gt. Government 
expenditure gt is an exogenous variable for the representative household because the 
government is Leviathan. The representative household maximizes its expected economic utility 
considering the behavior of government reflected in gt in its budget constraint. It is assumed that 
0>′Pu  and 0<′′Pu , and the population is constant..  
     Note that the time preference rate of government Gθ  is not necessarily identical to the 
time preference rate of the representative household Pθ . This property of heterogeneity plays 
an important role later in this study. The reasons why the rates of time preference are different 
between government and the representative household can be summed up as follows: (i) a 
government is chosen from among many political parties not only from an economic point of 
view but also from a political one while the time preference rate of the representative household 
is related only to economic activities and not to political activities; (ii) a government is usually 
chosen by the median of households under a proportional representation system and thus the 
converged policy reflects the median voter—not the mean voter—while a representative 
household is basically the mean household;9 (iii) even though people want to choose a party 
that has the same time preference rate as the representative household, those of the chosen party 
                                                          
8 The constraint is equivalent to ( ) ( )ttttttttt πRbsxbckfk −+−−−−= && . 
9 See the literature on the median voter theorem (e.g., also Downs 1957), and also see the literature on the delay in 
reforms (e.g., Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992; Alesina and Drazen 1991). 
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may differ from those of the representative household owing to errors in expectations (e.g., 
Alesina and Cukierman, 1990); and (iv) current voters cannot bind the choices of future voters 
and thus if current voters are aware of this possibility, they may vote more myopically 
compared to their own rates of impatience in private economic activities (e.g., Tabellini and 
Alesina, 1990). Hence, it seems that the rates of time preference of government and the 
representative household are usually heterogeneous. It should be also noted, however, that even 
though the rates of time preference are heterogeneous, a Leviathan government behaves based 
only on its own time preference rate without hesitation 
 
3. Neither Ricardian nor non-Ricardian fiscal regime 
     Before examining fiscal sustainability with the model, an important aspect of the model 
must be examined to help understand the analyses on fiscal sustainability presented in the 
following sections. A unique feature of the model is that it explicitly includes the political utility 
function of government. The FTPL and the quantity theory of money on which the conventional 
theory of fiscal sustainability is based do not explicitly assume the political utility function of 
government. Nevertheless, it is easily shown that these theories implicitly assume a common 
special political utility function of government such that ( ) ( )dttθ,xguE GttG −∫ ∞ exp00 = 
constant for any gt and xt; thus Gu  is constant. Let Hamiltonian 1H  be 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tttttttGttG sxgπRbλtθ,xguH −−+−+−= 11 exp  
where tλ1  is a costate variable. The optimality conditions are  
(1) 01 =∂
∂
tg
H ,   
(2) 01 =∂
∂
tx
H ,    
(3) 
t
t
b
H
dt
dλ
∂
∂−= 11 ,     
 11
(4) 
t
t
λ
H
dt
db
1
1
∂
∂−= ,      
(5) 0lim 1 =∞→ ttt bλ .     
If the utility function of the government is that Gu  is constant, then conditions (1) and (2) are 
011 =−=∂
∂
t
t
λ
g
H  and 011 ==∂
∂
t
t
λ
x
H  thus 01 =tλ . Thereby, conditions (1) and (2) hold for any 
e
tbπ , , πt, gt, xt, and st in any period. In addition, in case of 01 =tλ , condition (3) 
( ) 011 =−−= tttt πRλdt
dλ  holds for any e tbπ , , πt, gt, xt, and st in any period. Hence, the optimality 
conditions are condition (4) and the transversality condition (5). Here, condition (4) is 
equivalent to the budget constraint ( ) ttttttt sxgπRbb −−+−=& . As a result, if the political 
utility function of the government is a special one such that Gu  is constant, then the optimality 
conditions are (i) the budget constraint ( ) ttttttt sxgπRbb −−+−=&  and (ii) the 
transversality condition. Needless to say, both the FTPL and the quantity theory of money are 
commonly based upon (i) the budget constraint and (ii) the transversality condition.  
     Hence, the difference between FTPL and the quantity theory of money is merely the 
difference between interpretations of (i) the budget constraint and (ii) the transversality 
condition. As is known well, two extremely different interpretations are possible. Because 
conditions (1) and (2) hold for any e tbπ , , πt, gt, and xt in any period and thus 
e
tbπ , , πt, gt, and xt are 
indeterminate, exogenously setting either the values on prices e tbπ , and πt or the values on 
government behavior gt and xt is necessary for completing a model based on the FTPL or the 
quantity theory of money. The former option is called Ricardian, and the latter option is called 
non-Ricardian.10 Theoretically both options are equally possible, and it is difficult to judge a 
                                                          
10 Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999) argue that, in the Ricardian regime, the control of money supply on the 
assumption of the quantity theory of money is not sufficient to fix the time path of inflation rate. Traditionally a 
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priori which option is more consistent with the real world.  
     The above result highlights the fundamental difference between the model in this paper 
and the models based on the FTPL or the quantity theory of money. In this model, neither fiscal 
policy nor inflation is indeterminate and must be given ad hoc and exogenously but, as will be 
shown in the following section, both are determined through the simultaneous optimization of 
the government and the representative household. This is in sharp contrast to the FTPL as well 
as the quantity theory of money, which presume that either the Ricardian or the non-Ricardian 
regime is given ad hoc and exogenously. Contrarily, it does not matter whether the fiscal regime 
is Ricardian or non-Ricardian in my model because political utility ( )ttG xgu ,  changes as the 
government maneuvers control variables gt and xt in its optimization. 
 
III. FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY 
 
1. Inflation 
     Because the purpose of this paper is to examine fiscal sustainability in an inflationary 
environment, the nature of inflation in the model is examined before analyzing fiscal 
sustainability. Let Hamiltonian 2H  be ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tttttttGttG sxgπRbλtθ,xguH −−+−+−= 22 exp  
where tλ2  is a costate variable. The optimality conditions of the government’s optimization 
problem shown in II. 2. are  
(6) ( ) ( ) tG
t
ttG λtθ
g
,xgu
2exp −=−∂
∂ ,  
(7) ( ) ( ) tG
t
ttG λtθ
x
,xgu
2exp =−∂
∂ ,     
(8) ( )tttt πRλλ −−= 22& ,   
(9) ( ) ttttttt sxgπRbb −−+−=& ,       
                                                                                                                                                                          
monetarist type rule (e.g., purely speculative time trends in velocity) has been often assumed implicitly. 
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(10) 0lim 2 =∞→ ttt bλ .       
Combining conditions (6), (7), and (8) yields the following equations:  
( )
( ) teb,ttttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
ππrπRθ
g
g
g
,xgu
g
,xgug
−+=−=+
∂
∂
∂
∂
&2
2
 and 
( )
( ) teb,ttttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
ππrπRθ
x
x
x
,xgu
x
,xgux
−+=−=+
∂
∂
∂
∂
− &
2
2
. 
Because 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
g
g
g
,xgu
g
,xgug &  and 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
x
x
x
,xgu
x
,xgux &  at steady state such that 0=tg&  
and 0=tx& , then te tbtG ππrθ −+= , . Here, by the optimality conditions of the representative 
household, Pt θr =  at steady state such that 0=tc& , 0=tk&  and 0=tg& . Hence 
t
e
tbPG ππθθ −+= ,  and thus 
(11) PGt
e
tb θθππ −+=,  
at steady state such that 0=tg& , 0=tx& , 0=tc& , and 0=tk& .   
     Equation (11) is a natural consequence of simultaneous optimization by a Leviathan 
government and the representative household. What should be stressed is that t
e
tb ππ ≠,  if the 
rates of time preference are heterogeneous between the government and the representative 
household. Some may be surprised by the possibility that t
e
tb ππ ≠,  because it has been 
naturally conjectured that t
e
tb ππ =, . However, this conjecture is a simple misunderstanding 
because, as was explained above, e tbπ ,  indicates a total price change by inflation during a unit 
of period such that dsππ
wt
wt s
e
b,t ∫ + +−= 1 . On the other hand, tπ  indicates the instantaneous rate of 
inflation at a point such that 
t
tht
h
t
t
t p
h
pp
p
p
π
−
==
+
→0
lim& . Equation (11) therefore indicates that tπ  
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develops according to the integral equation PG
wt
wt st
θθdsππ +−= ∫ + +−1 . The conjecture te tb ππ =,  
is true in case of constant tπ . Because of dsππ
wt
wt s
e
b,t ∫ + +−= 1 , if tπ  is constant, then the equation 
t
e
tb ππ =,  holds, but if tπ  is not constant, the equation te tb ππ =,  does not necessarily hold. 
Equation (11) indicates that the equation t
e
tb ππ =,  holds only in a special case such that 
PG θθ =  (i.e., a homogeneous rate of time preference). Probably because the homogeneous rate 
of time preference such that PG θθ =  has been regarded as naturally prevailing, the equation 
t
e
tb ππ =,  has not generally been questioned. However, as was argued above, a homogeneous 
rate of time preference is not usually guaranteed. 
     What does equation (11) (or the integral equation PG
wt
wt st
θθdsππ +−= ∫ + +−1 ) indicate? It 
indicates that inflation accelerates or decelerates when the rates of time preference are 
heterogeneous.11 If tπ  is constant, the equation dsπππ
wt
wt s
e
tb,t ∫ + +−== 1  holds, and conversely if 
dsπππ
wt
wt s
e
tb,t ∫ + +−=≠ 1 , then tπ  is not constant. Without the acceleration or deceleration of 
inflation, therefore, equation (11) cannot hold in an economy with PG θθ ≠ . That is, inflation 
accelerates or decelerates as a result of reconciling the contradiction in heterogeneous rates of 
time preference.  
 
2. The sustainable fiscal debt 
     Much of the sustainability literature since Hamilton and Flavin (1986) defines fiscal 
sustainability as the implementation of a fiscal policy by which the transversality condition is 
satisfied. As in the literature, this paper defines fiscal sustainability also as implementing a 
fiscal policy by which the transversality condition (10) is satisfied. Hamilton and Flavin (1986) 
                                                          
11 The model can be used to analyze inflation. See, Harashima (2004, 2005). 
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show that the sustainable fiscal debt is equal to the present value of primary balances discounted 
by the interest rate. On the other hand, Bohn (1995) argues that, in a stochastic environment, the 
sustainable fiscal debt is equal to the present value of primary balances discounted by the 
marginal rate of substitution. In this subsection, I examine the sustainable fiscal debt in an 
inflationary environment. 
     First, the return on government bonds is examined. By equation (11), 
PGtttt
e
tb θθπrRππ −=−−=−,  at steady state. Hence,  
(12) Gtt θπR =−   
at steady state because e tbtt πrR ,+=  and Pt θr = . Equation (12) indicates that the real return on 
government bonds ttG,t πRr −=  is equal to the time preference rate of government Gθ  at 
steady state, (i.e., GG,t θr = ). Intuitively the equation GG,t θr =  appears quite reasonable 
because the equation GG,t θr =  is analogous to the well-known steady state condition Pt θr =  
in the private sector in the Ramsey model.  
     By equations (11) and (12), the requirement for satisfying the transversality condition 
(10) is obtained. Substituting equations (11) and (12) into conditions (8) and (9) and solving 
both differential equations yields the equation: ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−−−= ∫ #2 1exp Cdtbsxgbλ tttttt  at steady 
state where C# is a certain constant. Thereby, it is necessary to satisfy 0<−− ttt sxg  and 
∞=∫∞→ dtbtt
1lim  for the transversality condition (10) to be held. Here, by condition (9), 
t
ttt
G
t
t
b
sxg
θ
b
b −−+=&  at steady state. Hence if 0=−−+=
t
ttt
G
t
t
b
sxg
θ
b
b&  at steady state, then 
tb  is constant and thus ∞=∫∞→ dtbtt
1lim . Thereby, the transversality condition holds. However, if 
0<−−+=
t
ttt
G
t
t
b
sxg
θ
b
b&  at steady state, then tb  diminishes to zero and the transversality 
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condition (10) cannot hold because 0<−− ttt sxg . If 0>−−+=
t
ttt
G
t
t
b
sxg
θ
b
b&  at steady 
state, then G
t
t
t
θ
b
b =
∞→
&
lim  and thus tb  increases as time passes and ∫ =∞→
Gt
t θ
Cdt
b
##1lim  where C## 
is a certain constant. The transversality condition (10) therefore also cannot hold and thus, if and 
only if 
t
ttt
G b
sxg
θ
−−−=  at steady state can the transversality condition (10) 0lim 2 =∞→ ttt bλ  
hold. The requirement 
t
ttt
G b
sxg
θ
−−−=  indicates that the increase of government debt tGbθ  
(i.e., the real return on government bonds times accumulated debts) should be equal to the 
primary surplus ( )ttt sxg −−−  at steady state. 
     The requirement 
t
ttt
G b
sxg
θ
−−−=  also implies that the sustainable fiscal debt in an 
inflationary environment is different from that in a non-inflationary environment that is argued 
in Hamilton and Flavin (1986). The sustainable fiscal debt in Hamilton and Flavin (1986) is 
equal to the present value of primary balances discounted by the interest rate. The present value 
of primary balances at steady state in Hamilton and Flavin (1986) is 
( ) ( ) =−−+− +++−∞∫ djsxgr jtjtjtj0 1 ( ) ( ) =+−−− −∞∫ djrsxg jttt 0 1  =−−− r sxg ttt  
P
ttt
θ
sxg −−− . However, the requirement 
t
ttt
G b
sxg
θ
−−−=  indicates that the 
sustainable fiscal debt ∗tb  must satisfy the condition 
(13) 
G
ttt
t θ
sxgb −−−=∗ . 
Hence, if PG θθ > , then 
P
ttt
G
ttt
t θ
sxg
θ
sxgb −−−<−−−=∗  and the sustainable fiscal debt ∗tb  
is less than the present value of primary balances discounted by the interest rate 
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( ) ( )djsxgr jtjtjtj +++−∞ −−+− ∫0 1 , i.e., ( ) ( )djsxgrb jtjtjtjt +++−∞∗ −−+−< ∫0 1 . 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
1. The problem of discount factor  
     Equation (13) indicates that, in a deterministic but inflationary environment (i.e., 
PG θθ > ), the sustainable fiscal debt needs to be less than the one discounted by the interest 
rate.12 The sustainable fiscal debt is therefore quite different from that in Hamilton and Flavin 
(1986). An intuitive explanation of this result is that, because the inequality PG θθ >  means 
that the real return on government bonds is larger than the interest rate, government debts grow 
more rapidly and thus the sustainable fiscal debt must be smaller. As equation (12) indicates, the 
real return on government bonds ttG,t πRr −=  is equal to the time preference rate of 
government at steady state (i.e., GtG θr =, ), and thus the real return on government bonds 
GG,t θr =  is larger than the interest rate Pt θr =  if PG θθ > . Nevertheless, if PG θθ =  (i.e, if in 
a non-inflationary environment), then equation (13) also indicates that 
=−−−=−−−=−−−=∗
r
sxg
θ
sxg
θ
sxgb ttt
P
ttt
G
ttt
t ( ) ( )djsxgr jtjtjtj +++−∞ −−+− ∫0 1  
as in the model in Hamilton and Flavin (1986). In other words, the conventional model 
implicitly assumes a non-inflationary environment such that PG θθ = . 
     Equation (13) questions the appropriateness of Hamilton and Flavin’s (1986) fiscal 
sustainability test. This kind of test may be valid if in a non-inflationary environment, but 
equation (13) indicates that in an inflationary environment, satisfying the equation 
                                                          
12 In a deflationary environment (i.e., 
PG θθ < ), the sustainable fiscal debt is more than the present value of 
primary balances discounted by the interest rate such that 
P
ttt
G
ttt
t θ
sxg
θ
sxgb −−−>−−−=∗ . 
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( ) ( )djsxgrb jtjtjtjt +++−∞∗ −−+−= ∫0 1  does not guarantee fiscal sustainability. To claim 
fiscal sustainability in an inflationary environment, the equation 
( ) ( )djsxgθb jtjtjtjGt +++−∞∗ −−+−= ∫0 1  instead needs to be satisfied. This discount factor 
problem may not be serious when this kind of test is applied to most developed countries where 
inflation is currently very low, but it may be more important when this kind of test is applied to 
some developing countries where even now high inflation is endemic. In those countries, even if 
fiscal sustainability is validated by Hamilton and Flavin’s (1986) test, debts may not be 
sustainable in reality. 
     The discount factor problem in Hamilton and Flavin’s test has also been raised from 
another point of view. Bohn (1995) criticizes it for not considering stochastic environments and 
argues that, in a stochastic environment, the discount factor cannot be represented by the real 
interest rate but rather by the marginal rate of substitution. Tests using arbitrarily selected real 
interest rates are therefore inappropriate. This paper raises another important problem regarding 
the choice of discount factor. Even in a deterministic environment, the real interest rate is not 
the appropriate discount factor if the environment is deterministic and inflationary.  
 
2. The interrelation between debt and inflation 
     Many empirical studies analyzing the relation between government debt and inflation 
assume a simple linear relation between them (e.g., Karras, 1994; Darrat, 2000; Fischer, Sahay, 
and Végh, 2002). My model indicates, however, that the relation between the level of 
government debt and the inflation rate is not linear and is much more complex because the level 
of government debt and the acceleration of inflation depend commonly on Gθ . For example, 
equations (11) and (13) indicate that a situation such that 0=tb&  while 0≠tπ&  is possible. 
Many empirical studies indicate that the relation between the level of government debt and the 
inflation rate is unclear and inconclusive. This inconclusiveness may be due to the incorrect 
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assumption that the relation between the two is linear.  
     Equation (13) also suggests an interesting aspect of the interrelation between government 
debt and inflation. Assume that initially PG θθ =  but Gθ  is unexpectedly raised to be #Gθ  at a 
time and thus, after that time, PG θθ ># . This unexpected surprise upward shift of the time 
preference rate of government has interesting consequences. First, inflation starts to accelerate 
by equation (11). Secondly, the real value of sustainable government bonds 
G
ttt
t θ
sxgb −−−=∗  
is shifted to be 
#
G
#
t
#
t
#
t*#
t θ
sxgb −−−=  where both the sustainable fiscal debt and steady state 
primary balance are smaller than before such that *t
*#
t bb <  and ( ) ( )ttt#t#t#t sxgsxg −−−<−−− . 
The downward shifts of the sustainable fiscal debt and steady state primary balance are 
analogous to those of capital stock and consumption in the Ramsey model on the private 
economy. Government debt ∗tb  corresponds to the capital stock in the Ramsey model. The 
primary balance ( )ttt sxg −−−  corresponds to consumption in the Ramsey model. Finally, the 
time preference rate of government Gθ  that equals the real return on government bonds at 
steady state as was shown in equation (12) corresponds to the time preference rate of the 
representative household that equals the real interest rate at steady state in the Ramsey model. 
As both steady state capital and consumption shift downwards in the Ramsey model if the time 
preference rate of the representative household shifts upwards, both steady state government 
debt and primary balance shift downwards if the time preference rate of government shifts 
upwards. As a result, *t
*#
t bb <  and ( ) ( )ttt#t#t#t sxgsxg −−−<−−−  when Gθ  shifts upwards 
such that PG θθ ># . Because market participants know this mechanism and thus nobody buy 
these bonds in markets unless the real value of government bonds has sufficiently fallen in this 
environment of accelerating inflation, the real value of already issued government bonds soon 
falls from ∗tb  to 
*#
tb . 
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     If the time preference rate of government is unexpectedly raised, therefore, households 
will experience double suffering, namely, from accelerating inflation and from the loss of the 
value of government bonds they hold. On the other hand, the government gains by the 
unexpected upward shift of Gθ  because steady state primary balance that the government is 
obligated to achieve in the future becomes smaller. This mechanism may tempt a government 
into raising Gθ  to lessen the burden of debts, although this action also accelerates inflation. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
     An important contribution of this paper is that the concept of fiscal sustainability is 
extended to an inflationary environment. Fiscal policies and inflation rates are determined 
simultaneously in the model. The model in this paper is therefore fundamentally different from 
models based on the FTPL or the quantity theory of money. The main findings of the paper are 
firstly that the sustainable fiscal debt is equal to the present value of primary balances 
discounted by the time preference rate of government. The sustainable fiscal debt is therefore 
less than the present value of primary balances discounted by the interest rate in an inflationary 
environment. This result appears very important, particularly when studying fiscal sustainability 
in developing countries where high inflation is still endemic. Secondly, the model indicates that 
the relation between the level of government debt and the inflation rate is not linear. The 
relation between them is unclear and inconclusive in empirical studies, possibly because the 
relation is wrongly assumed to be linear. In addition, the model indicates that a government 
gains by deliberately making inflation accelerate because the steady state primary balance 
decreases.  
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